Study Sheet No. 2
J. Budziszewski, What We Can't
Not Know
| Ch. | Q. | |
| Preface: Whom This Book Is For | ||
| 1 | For
whom is Budziszewski writing this book?
(pp. xv, xvii) |
|
| 2 | What two goals does he hope to achieve in his book? (pp. xvi) | |
| 3 | What
reasons does he give for supposing his 'constructive' approach,
emphasizing 'common truths,' is necessary? (pp. xvi-xvii) |
|
| 4 | What
position does he take towards those who reject natural law? (pp.
xvii-xviii) |
|
| 5 | Why
does he say, not only that he believes his opponents are 'confused,' but
that he thinks they "deeply want to be"? (p. xviii) |
|
| Introduction: The Moral Common Ground | ||
| 6 | What curious ambivalence, tension, or contradiction does Budziszewski note about moral skeptics and evasions? (pp. 3-4) | |
| 7 | In what ways do the assumptions of British bioethicist, Jonathan Glover, represent a major shift? (pp. 4-6) | |
| 8 | What follows if Glover's assumption is accepted? (pp. 6-7) | |
| 9 | What evidence does Budziszewski offer that it is not only intellectual geeks who think like Glover? (pp. 7-8) | |
| 10 | What rationales are offered by those who deny that there ever was a common moral ground for the 'illusion' that there was one? (p. 8) | |
| 11 | Define Peter Singer's 'utilitarianism.' (p. 9) | |
| 12 | What ironic inconsistency in Glover's writing does Budziszewski point out as evidence that what we can't not know, like "crabgrass," eventually breaks through the crust of our denials? (pp. 10-12) | |
| 13 | What is the "name" of the common ground, according to Budziszewski? (pp. 12-15) | |
| 14 | According to Budziszewski, what does "natural law" not mean? (pp. 14-15) | |
| 1. | Things we Can't Not Know | |
| 15 | What does knowing 'natural law' not mean, according to Budziszewski? (p. 19) | |
| 16 | How do we appeal to natural law "even to justify wrongdoing"? (p. 19) | |
| 17 | What are the basics of natural law, "as real as arithmetic"? (p. 20) | |
| 18 | How does Budziszewski illustrate his statement that "everything in Creation is a wannabe" by means of an acorn? And how is the human arrow unlike all others? (pp. 23-24) | |
| 19 | In what ways does Budziszewski suggest our knowledge of 'nature' may depend on 'tradition'? (pp. 25-26) | |
| 20 | What is Budziszewski's point when he says, borrowing the C.S. Lewis metaphor, that "we learn even our parlor manners in the family rooms"? (p. 26) | |
| 2. | What It Is That We Can't Not Know | |
| 21 | What two universals are in conflict, and to which biblical doctrines do we owe these, according to Budziszewski? (p. 28) | |
| 22 | Why does he call the Decalogue a "suggestive," rather than an "exhaustive," summary of natural law? (p. 29) | |
| 23 | Which of the two parts of the Decalogue do some find it odd to reckon as part of natural law, and why? (p. 29) | |
| 24 | Why does Budziszewski deny there is any contradiction in reckoning this part of the Decalogue as part of natural law? (pp. 29-30) | |
| 25 | What kinds of knowledge and obligations are implied by each of the Ten Commandments? (pp. 30-44) | |
| 26 | How much of the Fifth Commandment carries over into natural law? (p. 35) | |
| 27 | What is implied in the Sixth Commandment about marriage, according to Budziszewski? (pp. 35-37) | |
| 28 | How do even arguments against the Seventh Commandment "pay it homage between the lines"? (p. 38) | |
| 29 | What three ways of answering the would-be murderer's question does Budziszewski distinguish? (p. 40) | |
| 30 | How is 'utilitarianism' an example of an ethical theory attempting to derive moral rules from some 'Deeper Consideration,' and why is the natural law tradition opposed to such theories? (pp. 44-46) | |
| 31 | How are the Decalogue and Summary of the Law related? The natural law and the Bible? (pp. 49-50) | |
| 3. | Could We Get By Knowing Less? | |
| 32 | What is the 'Second Tablet Project,' and why does it often turn into a 'No Tablet' project? (pp. 51-52) | |
| 33 | How do the examples of the 'human pig,' Hugo Grotius, & the Platonist illustrate what difference it would make to the natural law if we didn't have spontaneous knowledge of God? (pp. 53-61) | |
| 34 | How do the examples of Jerry Seinfeld, Richard Lewontin, & Thomas Nagel illustrate what difference it would make to the natural law if we do have such knowledge but tell ourselves we don't? (pp. 61-64) | |
| 35 | In Part II of his Inquiry, why does the first subsection carry the heading "Forgiveness again"? (pp. 66-67) | |
| 36 | Why does the example of Sophie Choice occur in a section on "Providence," where Budziszewski says "one of the strongest motives to do wrong is to make everything go right"? (p. 67-69) | |
| 37 | Why does Budziszewski consider it dangerous to define persons in terms of what they do rather than what they are? (pp. 70-74) | |
| 4. | The First and Second Witness | |
| 38 | What is the difference between the attitudes of classical and modern education toward common moral sense of ordinary people, and what does this tell us about their respective understanding of first principles? (p. 77) | |
| 39 | What does Budziszewski mean by "first" and "second" moral knowledge, and what belongs to each? (p. 78) | |
| 40 | What are the "four witnesses" to what we can't not know, in Budziszewski's analysis? (p. 79) | |
| 41 | How is deep conscience (Synderesis) different from surface conscience (Conscientia), according to Budziszewski? (pp. 79-81) | |
| 42 | Why does deep conscience not depend on the state of one's feelings? (p. 81) | |
| 43 | How does Budziszewski use the examples of Darwin, Fred Hoyle, & George Wald to mount his argument that the design of the universe, as such, is irrepressibly known? (pp. 81-85) | |
| 44 | What three things does the mere recognition of design do for our moral knowledge, according to Budziszewski? (p. 85) | |
| 5. | The Third and Fourth Witnesses | |
| 45 | How do our very bodies have a 'language' whose meanings we cannot arbitrarily 'overwrite,' according to Budziszewski? (pp. 86-87) | |
| 46 | How do our 'interdependence,' 'complementarity,' 'spontaneous order,' and 'subsidiarity' witness to our own design? (pp. 87-94) | |
| 47 | What point does Budziszewski find in the fact that "each of us can perform every vital function by himself, except one"? (p. 89) | |
| 48 | How is the family important, and how does it 'convert' us? (pp. 91-92) | |
| 49 | What are the principles of 'connaturality' and 'diminishing spontaneity'? (p. 92-93) | |
| 50 | What three points does Budziszewski make from his reckless driving example about civil penalties, and what analogous points does he make about natural pentalties? (pp. 94-102) | |
| 51 | Distinguish the procreative and unitive good of marriage, and explain Budziszewski's point about the latter in connection with sodomy. (pp. 96-98, 100) | |
| 52 | What is the only witness Hobbes recognizes, and which does he flatly deny? (pp. 103-104) | |
| 6. | Some Objections | |
| 53 | How does Budziszewski rebut the accusation that he is confused about whether natural law is from God, nature, conscience or reason? (pp. 107-108) | |
| 54 | What are the three 'norms' of natural law? (p. 108) | |
| 55 | What different sense of the word 'natural' does Budziszewski say his questioner confuses? (p. 109) | |
| 56 | Why is plugging a leak in a radiator 'natural,' but not cloning, according to Budziszewski? (pp. 109-110) | |
| 57 | What analogy does Budziszewski draw between the purposes of our sexual powers and the purpose of a car's steering wheel? (pp. 110-111) | |
| 58 | Explain Budziszewski's distinction between the 'phenomenon' and 'theory' of natural law? (p. 111) | |
| 59 | Why does Budziszewski deny that those who deny natural law are "in denial"? (pp. 113-114) | |
| 60 | What purposes does moral education serve? (pp. 114-115) | |
| 61 | What's the difference between saying that knowledge of natural law is 'innate' (which Budziszewski denies) and saying that it's per se nota ('known in itself,' or 'underived')? (p. 116) | |
| 62 | How is the idea of "common ground" understood differently by Budziszewski and his questioner? (pp. 129-130) | |
| 63 | Why does Budziszewski not just rely on the Bible? (p. 131) | |
| 7. | Denial | |
| 64 | What is more troubling than the fact that surface conscience can err, according to Budziszewski? (p. 139) | |
| 65 | What are the three modes of conscience? (p. 140) | |
| 65 | What are the "Five Furies," and how do they operate in the abnormal, avenging mode, as opposed to the normal mode? (p. 140) | |
| 66 | How does Budziszewski illustate the 'Fury' of remorse from the examples of Mary Meehan, Warren M. Hern, Nita Whitten, and Kathy Sparks? (pp. 143-144) | |
| 67 | How does Budziszewski illustrate the 'Fury of confession by 'blurts' & shows like Jerry Springer? | |
| 68 | Why do bad confessions effective in persuasion, according to Budziszewski? (p. 146) | |
| 69 | Contrast the 'pathetic' and 'happy' ending and compare what they have in common. How does George E. Delury's story illustrate a pathetic ending? (pp. 146-148) | |
| 70 | How does Budziszewski illustrate the 'Fury' of atonement by the example of an abortion, abortion liturgies, and self-inflicted tortures of RU486 procedures? (pp. 149-151) | |
| 71 | How does Budziszewski illustrate the 'Fury' of reconciliation by the shared guilt of euthanasia and other examples? (pp. 152-154) | |
| 72 | Why does Budziszewski consider the 'Fifth Fury' perhaps the 'most dangerous'? (p. 154) | |
| 73 | How does he illustrate the 'Fury' of justification? What are the six possibilities of rationalization he explores in the proposition: "It is wrong to deliberately take innocent human life"? (pp. 156-159) | |
| 74 | According to Budziszewski, what is the purpose of the 'Furies'? (pp. 159-160) | |
| 8. | Eclipse | |
| 75 | What evidence does Budziszewski present concerning the "Atrophy of Tradition"? (pp. 162-163) | |
| 76 | What philosophical reasons does Budziszewski suggest there might be for the "Cult of the Expert"? (p. 164f.) | |
| 77 | How do Postmodernism, Epistemological relativism, and Antifoundationalism represent the thinking of 'Sophists'? (pp. 166-169) | |
| 78 | How did pre-literate societies avoid the "Infantile Regression of Public Reflection" that afflicts our contemporary society, according to Budziszewski? (pp. 169-170) | |
| 79 | How does Budziszewski use the frontispiece of Hobbes' Leviathan to illustrate how a picture may not be worth a thousand words if one is visually illiterate? What does he mean? (pp. 170-171) | |
| 80 | How do the "shock and shame" of McFarlane Toys, mainstream movies, and video games disable our apprehension of natural law? (pp. 172-173) | |
| 81 | How does the recent 'prolongation of adolescence' transmute erotic desire from a spur to marriage to an incentive for promiscuity? (pp. 174-176) | |
| 82 | Why does Budziszewski say that saying we need to get in touch with our feelings is "like trying to revive a drunk with vodka," and what examples does he give of the "cult of feelings"? (p. 176-180) | |
|
|
||
| 9. | The Public Relations of Moral Wrong | |
| 83 | Why does Budziszewski deny that there is a "vast array of possible moralities," of which "only one" is true? (pp. 185-186) | |
| 84 | How is cohabitation a species of 'imposture,' the same-sex marriage movement a species of 'unraveling,' and both a species of 'cannibalizing conscience'? (pp. 186-188) | |
| 85 | What is "Seducing Paraconscience," and what makes compassion such a vulnerable candidate? (pp. 188-190) | |
| 86 | What is "Doubling the Script," and explain Budziszewski's examples involving abortion and the Holocaust. (pp. 191-195) | |
| 87 | What are the "Seven Degrees of Descent," and what brings them about? (pp. 195-197) | |
| 10. | The Public Relations of Moral Right | |
| 88 | Explain how Budziszewski sees the public relations of moral wrong as akin to "black magic" or goeteia, illustrating it from the homosexual and euthanasia movements and cloning and eugenics projects. (pp. 198f.) | |
| 89 | How does feminism illustrate, for Budziszewski, how a movement with a good end becomes corrupted by making peace with evil? How do Eileen L. McDonagh's remarks reinforce this, in his view? (pp. 199f.) | |
| 90 | What two things are necessary for the public relations of moral right, according to Budziszewski? (p. 200) | |
| 91 | What are the permanent advantages of good and evil, and what is to be avoided? (pp. 200-204) | |
| 92 | What is to be done? (pp. 204-208) | |
| 93 | Explain and illustrate each of the "Countermeasures" against a) Cannibalizing conscience, b) seducing paraconscience, and c) doubling the script. (pp. 208-212) | |
| 94 | What is the objective of Budziszewski's hypothetical statesman's speech on p. 210? | |
| 95 | What does Budziszewski mean by "calling [a person's] bluff"? (pp. 211-212) | |
| 11. | Possible Futures | |
| 96 | What two possible futures does Budziszewski sketch? (pp. 213-217) | |
| 97 | What futures logically follow making peace with abortion, flirting with voluntary euthanasia, romanticizing promiscuity, separating sex from procreation, and experimenting with stem cell hybrids? (pp. 214-215) | |
| 98 | What prevents this future from being inevitable? (p. 216) | |
| 99 | What conditions for opposing infanticide, viewing pregnancy as an illness, perversion, infidelity, compulsory euthanasia, viewing humans as mere means for supplying the organ harvest industry? (p. 216) |