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Stanley Fish in his The Trouble with Principleⁱ takes on the task of deconstructing political liberalism. Arguably the foremost living representative of the political liberal tradition is John Rawls who in a series of books and articles written over several decades has articulated and defended the tradition that Fish attacks.ⁱⁱ Fish is a prominent deconstructionist and literary critic who has taught at Duke University among other schools but is currently Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Illinois, Chicago. He is a well-known Milton scholar but has written widely in a number of areas including theology and law. He and Rawls are a contrast in styles. Fish goes for the jugular on every page. Rawls develops his arguments patiently and carefully over time but always attempts to give his opponents the utmost consideration. Furthermore, while Rawls learning is vast he has pursued one basic theme over his entire professional life. His lifelong goal has been to develop and articulate a set of principles that define the fundamental nature of justice to which every rational person who is able to adopt a neutral position should and would agree. Fish has devoted a considerable portion of his intellectual career in attempting to demonstrate that there are no such principles and that claiming the existence of such principles is both misleading and destructive.

"The trouble with principle is, first, that it does not exist, and, second, that nowadays many bad things are done in its name." (Fish, 2) Why do principles not exist? Why are bad things done in its name? Because argues Fish, principles are abstractions-empty vessels waiting to be filled with content representing the specific interests of those who can best manipulate the language of 'principle' for those specific interests. Fish spares no one-political liberalism, academic freedom "The debate is never between the inclusive university and a university marked by exclusions, the debate is always between competing structures of exclusion--politics is all there is and it's a good thing too." (Fish, 44-45) Rawls, multiculturalism, "no one could be a multiculturalist in any interesting and coherent sense" (Fish, 63) the ACLU "That curious organization whose mission it is to find things that it hates and then to grow them" (Fish, 43) the First Amendment.

That is to say, the abstractions at the center of the First Amendment jurisprudence--freedom of expression, the free flow of ideas, seif-realization, self governance, equality, autonomy--do not in themselves point us to the appropriate distinctions or help us to order a set of facts on the way to rendering an opinion. Before we can proceed to do those things, the abstractions have to be filled in with specifications of what is included in their scope, specifications they themselves do not provide. (Fish, 141)

The specifications are filled in by political agendas. Appeals to principles are either based on a self-conscious attempt to manipulate, intimidate and coerce or if one chooses to be generous an unconscious attempt to do so. Social harmony insofar as it exists is the management of conflict.

Rawls on the other hand argues that since we live a society that is religiously pluralistic and also pluralistic with respect to numerous non-religious conceptions of the good, it is necessary that these principles be discovered, defended and articulated in language that excludes appeals to ultimate good. Furthermore, defense of these principles demands rejection of appeals to epistemological grounds that are not open to all. Since there are principles (which are free standing and thus can be grasped independently of comprehensive or metaphysical doctrines) something more than a 'modus vivendi' or a temporary agreement based on a balance of power is possible. (LP, 19)

Rawls affirms the existence of a public realm with public principles that define the structure of a social order for a pluralistic society. This realm properly excludes assumptions about the nature of ultimate good and epistemological appeals that are not common to all--at least to all reasonable persons. He also affirms the existence of a non-public realm that includes individuals and groups that do have conceptions of the ultimate good and do appropriately make eplstemological claims that other individuals or groups might not accept. (LP, 138) The implications of this for the validity of religious discourse should be clear. Religious metaphysical and epistemological claims have no place in the public sphere. To introduce them is divisive and threatens both the legitimate liberties of others and the social order that we all desire. They are, however, legitimate in the private sphere. Rawls argues that what must be excluded is not only what are commonly thought to be all religious language and claims but also any 'comprehensive' doctrines.ⁱⁱⁱ Thus, language and claims that we commonly identify with 'secular' theories of the good like those of Bentham, Kant and Mill are also excluded. Presumably the discourse of explicit 'Secular humanists' like those who write for "Free Inquiry" will also be excluded along with all Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, proponents of Native American Spiritually, etc. Thus, Rawls defends the exclusive use of secular language in the public square but it is a particular kind of 'secular' language. It is a language that is neutral not only with respect to various religions but also with respect to various secular comprehensive doctrines. It favors no particular religion or comprehensive secular doctrine. That is why it is fair. That is why it provides the best possible foundation for social harmony in a pluralistic democratic society. "There is, or need be, no war between religion and democracy. In this respect political liberalism is sharply different from and rejects Eniightenment Liberalism, which historically attacked orthodox Christianity." (LP, 175-6) Thus, the Rawlsian principles of justice are 'free standing' (PL, 140) in that they are not directly based on any comprehensive doctrine. They are not 'metaphysical' in that they do not make claims about the ultimate nature of reality. Thus, we may summarize our discussion up to this point by saying that Rawls believes that there are freestanding principles and the existence of such freestanding principles is essential to the survival of a liberal democratic order. Fish thinks there are no principles, certainly no freestanding principles and the best we can do is a balance of power. In the long run being epistemologically self-conscious about the absence of these principles will enable us to get the most social harmony possible. What is possible will not satisfy Rawls and political liberals in general but it is nonetheless the best we can do.

Rawls and the Original Position

Rawls is perhaps most famous for his positing of the device of the 'original position.' One is asked to imagine that he/she is choosing principles of justice in a state where the individual does not know anything about his/her particular identity. Thus in the 'original position' I know a lot about the world but nothing about myself. I do not know my age, my gender, my intellectual ability, my economic status, my social status, my state of health, what communities to which I belong, my level of education, my race, etc. Most importantly for our discussion, in the original position I do not know my conception of ultimate good. I do not know whether I am Christian, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, atheist, agnostic, Secular humanist, a Kantian believer in the ultimate value of autonomy a J.S. Mill utilitarian, etc.

Rawls then asks what principles of justice we would choose in this 'veil of ignorance.' He believes that we would choose three basic principles (although he refers to two principles with the second one having two parts). 1. A rational individual would choose a principle that guarantees the maximum amount of liberty consistent with equal liberty for all. Thus rational individuals would choose the maximum amount of civil liberty. 2. Rational individuals would choose a principle guaranteeing equality of opportunity. 3. Finally rational individuals would choose equal distribution of wealth, except where unequal distribution of wealth benefits the least advantaged. The veil of ignorance' removes the individual from any temptation to be biased in favor of his particular status and his particular conception of the good including any explicit religious convictions he or she may have.

Ronald F. Thiemann currently John Lord O'Brien Professor of Divinity and formerly Dean of Harvard Divinity School argues in his Religion in Public Lif:. A Dilemma for Democracy for the inclusion of religious discourse in public life.^iv Although he argues that Rawls doesn't go far enough, he sees in the development of Rawls' theory a positive development in this direction. I would describe Thiemann's position as cautiously optimistic about the movement in Rawls thought for making more room for including religious discourse in the public forum. I think that Thiemann's optimism is based on the four concessions I will outline below. It is also based on Rawls demonstrated willingness to receive criticism graciously and to revise his theory in the light of that criticism. I am not as optimistic as Thiemann (who it must be said knows Rawls personally as a colleague as I do not). My own opinion, which I would describe as a cautious pessimism in this regard, I will attempt to articulate below. First I will outline the concessions that Rawls has made to the use of religious language in public discourse. Secondly, I will sketch a typology that describes different motives for studying alternative comprehensive doctrines. Thirdly, I will then state my reservations about Rawls' perspective. Finally, I will conclude with my reservations about the position of Stanley Fish.

Concessions to Religion and Metaphysics

Over the years Rawls has attempted defend and modify his position to take account of the charge that he unfairly and unnecessarily excludes religion from public discourse. (1) Rawls insists that he does not mean that adherents of various religions and other comprehensive doctrines may not articulate positions about social justice. They do. They will. They should and this discourse cannot and should not be prevented. (2) Furthermore, to a considerable degree there will be an 'overlapping consensus' on a wide variety of issues with regard to social justice issues. This "overlapping consensus" is helpful perhaps necessary for a stable pluralistic democratic society. It has the effect of bringing religious conviction and motivation to the implementation of social justice. One might even argue that it is unrealistic to expect people to support a social order that they cannot see as linked to their conception of the ultimate good and buttressed by an epistemological authority (churches, synagogues, mosques, tradition, sacred scriptures, Kantian moral reason, etc.) that they see as decisive. (3) Besides recognizing the fact and usefulness of an "overlapping consensus" the later Rawls insists that comprehensive doctrines should be discussed in the "background institutions" of society. These background institutions include clubs, churches, universities, the media, etc. Besides the recognition of 'overlapping consensus,' and the permissibility and desirability of discussing the relationship of comprehensive doctrines to public policy in the 'background institutions' of society Rawls makes a third concession. (4) Sometimes it is necessary to explain one's comprehensive doctrine to political opponents in order to show them how what one is proposing is both reasonable and consistent with a just political order. Rawls cites the example of public support for church schools (PI,, 248-249 (LP, 154). We may call this reason the 'restoration of public trust' concession. (5) Rawls makes an additional concession. Comprehensive doctrines may be introduced when their introduction has the effect of strengthening the idea of public reason (read freestanding principles) itself. Rawls cites the example of the abolitionist and civil rights movement (PL, 247).

Why Study Alternative Comprehensive Doctrines?

There are several reasons for studying comprehensive positions inimical to one's own. (1) First one may study the position of others the better to manipulate, intimidate and coerce them.^v We may call this 'aggression' motive. (2) Secondly one may study the position of others to prevent being manipulated, intimidated or coerced by them. We may call this the 'counter aggression' motive. This may seem like a good alternative to those who have intellectual ability to become philosophers but lack the physical ability to engage in professional wrestling. One gets the impression that goals one and two come close to exhausting Fish's conception of what is possible through rhetoric. Wide groups of people, I fear think that this is what the legal profession is all about. One hires attorneys to intimidate one's opponents or to prevent them from intimidating you. (3) Reason number three I will call the 'evangelistic' motive. One learns the ins and outs of alternative positions to more effectively persuade adherents of them to the truth of your position. Evangelism-whether to some religious faith or to Kantian autonomy is not a maleficent enterprise, provided it is carried out with courtesy and the assumption that voluntary persuasion is a necessary condition for any genuine conversion. (4) One may, of course, learn about alternative positions in order to avoid being successfully evangelized by others however benevolent we think their motives. We may call this the 'counter evangelistic' motive. (5) One may learn about alternative positions because one regards them as what William James referred to as a live option (James, ). Thus, one may see oneself as a possible convert to a particular position and explore it to decide whether to convert or not. We may call this the 'live option' motive. (6) One may study an alternative position in order to better serve or act benevolently toward adherents of that position. Thus, a Jewish physician or professor may study Christian, Hindu or Muslim doctrine in order to be more sensitive to the needs of member of these groups. We may call this the 'benevolent service' motive. (7) One may study a doctrine that one abhors as a mirror to the dark side of one's own soul. Thus, I may try to understand a Hannibal Lector or a Klan doctrine in order to see a side of myself that I have repressed. We may call this the 'spiritual therapy' motive. (8) There are perhaps other motives but the final one I will mention assumes the epistemic value of the alternative position studied and the possibility that study of the alternative position can enrich one's own. We may call this the 'positive enrichment' motive. What are the epistemic assumptions that make this motive possible? It doe not require as is often implied that one intellectually (or existentially) suspend conviction in one's own position. It is not identical with motive (5) above. It allows that one believe that one knows the truth. It simply requires that one admit that one does not know the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Furthermore, it requires that one assume at least the possibility that the alternative comprehensive perspective may contain some insight or truth that is not currently firmly entrenched and clearly articulated in one's own perspective. Of course, our study of alternative positions may simultaneously embody a combination of these motives. Furthermore, one may begin study for one motive--for example coercion and end up with an alternative motive--being converted.

The 'Proviso': The Intolerant Conditions of Rawlsian Tolerance

We are now perhaps in a position to see why I have reservations about Rawls attitude toward religion in public life and why I think a 'guarded pessimism' is the most appropriate stance for the religious believer. What Rawls seems to exclude from public discourse is the positive enrichment motive described in number (8) above. There are some qualifications necessary here. Rawls is not trying to develop a comprehensive theory so he does not exclude the possibility that the study of an alternative theory may enrich one's personal perspective and life. An alternative comprehensive doctrine may have epistemic value for us or for Rawls himself. The study of alternative metaphysics, epistemology and philosophical anthropology may be good for the soul. It may lead believers in various communities to reach conclusions that are 'reasonable' according to criteria established by those who reason from the 'original position.' This study, however, cannot have epistemic value in such a way that it can contribute to an understanding of the nature of justice. Those in the 'original position' do not need comprehensive doctrines--even their own. Furthermore, the inclusion of comprehensive doctrines into public discourse can only be corrupting and divisive. Political liberalism cannot tolerate it--except under the condition of the 'proviso' (LP, 144-156). What is the 'proviso?' The proviso can be summarized by saying that the believer (Secular humanist, Christian or other) may articulate his or her theory of social justice in terms of a comprehensive view provided one is willing to "translate" one's reasons into the language of political liberalism at the appropriate time. This is fair because it makes the same requirement for all adherents to a comprehensive doctrine including those who think that the 'good' is the glory of God and those that think the 'good' is pleasure. It is useful because it avoids divisiveness and because all the important principles are translatable without recourse to metaphysical similarities or differences or epistemological considerations related to particular comprehensive doctrines. Rawls seems to assume that all people have or at least might have a particular comprehensive doctrine. My own experience with the teaching of undergraduates for over thirty years is that many have several comprehensive doctrines like they have several changes of clothes. Be that as it may, Rawls assumes that some comprehensive doctrines are reasonable, some are unreasonable and some are partially reasonable. Roman Catholicism is an example of a partially reasonable comprehensive doctrine. It is 'reasonable' Rawls argues to agree that an abortion in the first trimester should be legally allowed. Presumably a position that a person in the original position--a person whose moral intuitions are uncorrupted by the teaching of the Church-would agree to this standard. Since the Church disagrees with this position it is still partially reasonable but not completely so.^vi Rawls sets forth what he regards as criteria for a just war (LP, 94 -105)--which may include intervention in the affairs of a nation because in extreme cases it is denying its citizens rights that are deemed reasonable within the framework of political liberalism (LP, 93,ftnt6). From this it follows that Quakers since they affirm pacifism are possessed of only a partially reasonable comprehensive doctrine (LP, 105). One wonders how Quakers may translate their convictions about pacifism into the 'reasonable' discourse of political liberalism. The same question may be asked about the Roman Catholic view on abortion. What about the Jehovah's Witness's views concerning why they should be free to reject blood transfusions against medical advice-which they are free to do? What about their view that they ought to be free to reject blood transfusions for their minor children against medical advice--which they are not free to do. Similar questions may be asked about the views of Christian Scientists. When, if ever, should physician assisted suicide be allowed? What moral obligation do we have to the ecology? To animals? To generations yet unborn or even conceived? Can we answer these questions more effectively if we exclude the insights of Jewish and Christian tradition, Hindu and Buddhist thought, and Native American Spirituality? The exclusion of particular traditions from dialogue about particular issues seems likely to appear as an impoverishment of language, as exclusive rather than inclusive, as unreasonable and arbitrary. In other words, it will be thought to be illiberal rather than liberal. To the extent that it is perceived as arbitrary it is also likely to be divisive which is the opposite of what Rawls wants. Permission to enter into a debate provided one 'translates' into a secular language is likely to be perceived as no great concession if one is required to 'bracket' that which one holds most sacred.

The Original Position-Who Shall be the Gatekeepers?

For many people getting into the original position will seem like an unnatural act. Furthermore, it will appear to be an unsustainable activity. Finally, there is the problem of who we can trust to decide when one is really epistemologically pure. I will take these issues up in turn. First it is clear that Rawls' whole position rests on the principle that the 'right' can and must be defined independently of the 'good' if democracy is to be viable. This is a premise that is not simply rejected by fundamentalists in particular nor many religions in general. Alasdair MacIntyre sees this move as a clear invitation to a degeneration into emotivism as a philosophical position and worse as the position becomes culturally entrenched, an emotivist culture where rational discourse is impossible.^vii Although Rawls is clearly attracted to Kant and Mill, both of these found rational discourse about justice on a view of the ultimate good. For Kant it is autonomy. For Mill it is qualitative hedonism. Thus, Rawls is required to distance himself from the comprehensive doctrines of these two thinkers. This is not to mention Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas Hegel, Marx, etc. Although he is hardly a Platonist or a Fundamentalist, Stanley Fish is also insisting that attempts to divorce the 'right' from the 'good' by defining the 'right' in terms of free standing principles is fundamentally incoherent. Thus, it is probably not unfair to say that the position of Rawls is a minority one in the history of philosophy. The second problem with the original position is the problem of interpretation. This is the problem that Fish emphasizes. As we have quoted him above "Abstractions need to be filled with specifications"(p.1). If we need the original position to derive the basic principles in the first place, do we not need the original position to give those principles specification before they can be useful? Thus, we need hundreds perhaps thousands or perhaps millions of judges, lawyers, jurors, legislators and citizens who can think in the 'original position' in order to make the system work. This is a very high standard indeed. One dose not have to be either a Deconstructionist or a Calvinist to doubt the capacity of ordinary self-interested (sinful?) human beings to achieve this goal. In describing the responsibilities of citizenship, however, Rawls sets this very high standard. Rawls asks how citizens who are not government officials are to reason.

To answer this question, we say that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, is one of the political and social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring strength and vigor (LP, 135-6).

To appreciate the difficulty here we need emphasize that what the Rawlsian original position requires is not just the suspension of my assurance concerning my social situation in society. It does not simply ask the young to think that they might someday be old or the old to imagine what it might be like to be young, the rich to imagine what it is like to be poor, the straight what it is like to be gay, white what it is like to be black, etc. These things are difficult enough. Nevertheless, to some degree, for some of us, some of the time, this is possible. Although I submit that literature, drama, art and concrete lived experience where we encounter the other in a sustained full blooded relationship does more than philosophy can to engender this kind of experience.

But it is also not the case that what Rawls is requiring of us that we learn an alternative comprehensive doctrine so well that we can view life in terms of that alternative perspective. This also is not easy but it is possible. Alasdair MacIntyre gives a sophisticated account of it in his Whose Justice? Which Ralionality? where he refers to the possibility of acquiring a 2^nd first language.^viii A more common place example is where a mature adult converts from one religion to another. The Hindu who becomes a Christian or the Christian who becomes an atheist can still think like his or her former self and understand what it is like to think from the alternative perspective. Of course, having been a former adherent to a perspective is not absolutely necessary. Presumably Fish can approximate thinking like Milton in Milton's time even though he has never lived in Milton's time and believed as Milton did.^ix

What Rawls asks of us is not the ability or the effort to imagine that we are someone else and have empathy with a person with a radically different comprehensive perspective. Rawls demands that we achieve a position--in the 'original position' where we have intellectually (and presumably empathetically) divorced ourselves from all particular persons and all particular comprehensive positions. Justice requires not empathy but neutrality. I am not being asked to imagine myself having a different conception of the good. I am being asked to have no conception of the good. Fish describes this as an act of  "'self-evacuation,' for the imaginative act of entering the original position involves a bracketing and (for the time of sojourn) forgetting of every affiliation and association that makes you what you are." (Fish, 10). Philip Quinn quotes Sanford Levinson as referring to this as a requirement of 'epistemic abstinence' that is laid upon all who would enter the public debate about social justice. Levinson wonders and Quinn with him whether this is a reasonable, necessary or useful requirement.^x Fish, of course, thinks that this is impossible for anyone, including Rawls. But suppose that Rawls and a few other saintly philosophers have been able to achieve it. Is it a reasonable expectation to make as a criterion for citizenship? Would it not be more reasonable to expect this of a few philosophers who should be kings? But supposing it to be an attainable goal for large numbers of people, who would be in charge of determining when this epistemic abstinence had been achieved? By what criteria would they be chosen? The problem is not only one of refraining from using appeals to God, Allah or Kantian autonomy in the language of law and politics. That could easily be done. The problem is to avoid making self-conscious or latent appeals to comprehensive doctrines-in either case denying that the appeals are being made. How can we be sure, of Rawls, of the Supreme Court, of the Attorney General, of the President, of ourselves? How likely is it that the general population will trust their leaders to avoid these self-conscious or latent appeals? It is after all, not only deconstructionists and fundamentalists who distrust the ability of our politicians and judiciary to be fair.

Summary

It is not time to bring this discussion to a close but it is necessary to make concluding remarks for this paper. I have argued that although Rawls is certainly among those political liberals who is most accommodating to religious discourse in the public square that he does not go far enough. Specifically, although he recognizes the moral value of religious discourse regarding public policy he does so under very stringent conditions. He recognizes that religious discourse on some occasions may motivate religious people who would not otherwise support the agenda of political liberalism to support it. This is not a trivial concession. Fundamentalists for instance would do well to recognize that sometimes some Secular humanists agree with them on some issues and vice a versa. To grant that abolitionists and many civil leaders had religious motives and that there discourse and activities advanced civil liberties in this country is to give credit where credit is due and to set the historical record straight. This is more than many are willing to do but it cannot be described as excessively generous.

But what about the epistemic value of religious discourse? Most Christians have for centuries rejected Tertullian's position. "What hath Athens to do with Jerusalem? What hath Christ to do with Belial?" Augustine read the Platonists not simply to refute them but to enrich the understanding of the Christian faith by this reading. Aquinas read Aristotle (much of which as mediated by Muslim "infidels") not solely for apologetic purposes but once again to enrich the faith. To be sure, part of the motive was apologetic. Secondly, where pagan philosophy was seen to be in conflict with Christian faith, Christian epistemology, ontology and theological anthropology trumped their pagan counterparts. Nevertheless, non-Christians were recognized as having discovered (by general revelation) truths that Christians needed to appropriate. Pagan philosophy had epistemic value. It had epistemic value in ethics. Its moral value did not consist simply in that sometimes it was available to buttress Christian truth. Similar statements may be made about the Jewish and Muslim intellectual tradition. It does not seem to me that articulation of the Rawlsian 'proviso' leaves room for a comparable generosity.

Furthermore, I don't think that Rawls can go much farther to include religious discourse than he already has. His entire epistemology of political morality (as distinguished from non-political morality or epistemology with respect to other issues) is predicated on the superior truth-value in excluding all comprehensive doctrines including his own. He cannot jettison this part of his theory without radically altering the whole theoretical structure. Here Fish's criticism is relevant. Fish does not think that Rawls has successfully excluded his comprehensive doctrine. He has suppressed it. Quite likely he has repressed it.^xi He has not excluded it. His language is not neutral, however much he believes this to be the case. My sympathies are with Fish in this case but with important qualifications. Fish denies that there are principles. I simply want to deny that there are free standing principles. This denial does not commit me to the position that Rawls' principles are wrong. As a matter of fact I am very much inclined to believe that they are right. But we need more than fair principles. We need a proper understanding of fair principles. We further need the fair application of fair principles. Rawls believes that this can best be achieved by founding and interpreting these principles on grounds that are epistemically neutral with regard to comprehensive doctrines. I think that such epistemic neutrality is impossible. If we all bring our comprehensive doctrines 'out of the closet' as it were life will be messier. I believe, however, that this is the only way forward for democracy in a pluralistic society.

ⁱFish, Stanley, The Trouble With Principle (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999)

ⁱⁱTheory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1971); Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Collected Papers, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1999); The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999)

ⁱⁱⁱThe term 'comprehensive' doctrine is used to convey two distinct but related meanings. On the one hand it refers to the fact that Rawls does not intend a complete moral theory. He only intends a political morality. But Rawls also wants to avoid making claims about the ultimate nature of reality. He does not want to make 'metaphysical' claims. Thus, his 1985 essay "Justice As Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" captures much of Rawls intent in the term 'comprehensive.' See Rawls, John, "Justice As Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" in Rawls, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp. 388-414.

^ivRonald F. Thiemann, Religion in Public Life. A Dilemma for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: A Century Fund Book, Georgetown University Press, 1996)

^vA number of years ago I had a student who gave as his reason for majoring in philosophy as: "So I can learn how to spear Lutherans." I did not regard this as the noblest of motives but thought that on some occasions it could be deserved and also have some utility. It later came out, however, that what he intended was to demonstrate to some of: our freshmen coeds that the foundations of their faith was weaker than they supposed. Not only did I not think this an especially noble activity but I am influenced by Freud enough to be uneasy with the metaphor he had chosen to describe his philosophical project.

^viThis seems to clearly what Rawls is saying in Political Liberalism, p. 243. See footnote 32. In The Law of the Peoples, however, he hedges this conclusion pp.169-171. I think, however, that his qualifications in Law of' the Peoples do not change the point I am making. If Roman Catholics want to make a case against abortion in the public realm they must leave their comprehensive views at the door. Of course, those who want to argue for the 'right' of a woman to have an abortion under specific or all conditions must leave their comprehensive doctrines at the door as well.

^viiAlasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1984).

^viiiAlasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, pp. 370-388.

^ixFish would probably not agree with this statement. A radical deconstructionist would have to deny the possibility of cross-cultural and cross comprehensive worldview understanding. Whether Fish agrees or not or whether such understanding is possible or not does not effect the point of my argument. My point is that this is not what Rawls is asking us to do.

^xPhilip Quinn, "Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious," Presidential Address of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 69, No. 2, November 1995, p. 48.

^xiHere I make a distinction associated with Freud. I can self-consciously suppress a behavior by failing to act or give expression to feelings that I know that I have. I unconsciously repress behavior that is part of my unconscious. The deconstructionist project may be viewed as an extension of the Freudian project. The deconstructionist uncovers the hidden motive of domination that is built into the discourse of the politically, socially (or academically) elite. The uncovering results in the deconstruction of the language of domination. The least generous interpretation of what is going on in a linguistic community is that the elites of the community are attempting to dominate and they know it. They are self-consciously suppressing this knowledge in order to maintain their dominance. More generous (although hardly generous) interpretation is that the elites are repressing this knowledge in order to maintain their dominance .

As I have said, I think that Rawls is right about there being principles. He is just wrong about there being free standing principles. Of course if Fish is right then both Rawls and I are wrong and what is going on here is not a search for truth but a search for dominance. Both Rawls and I (as do all believers) affirm that there is something more than power. Thus, in the final analysis we are allies against Fish. If we are right then Fish is wrong. There are principles. In the Christian understanding Fish really knows this (cf Romans chapters 1 &2). If he knows this consciously then he is suppressing this knowledge perhaps because he has made an intellectual career out of denying that there are principles. In which case, Rawls would perhaps call upon him to be reasonable. For my part, in the context of my comprehensive doctrine, I would have to call on him to repent. If he doesn't know this consciously, then he has repressed this knowledge. In which case, Rawls would try to reason with him to convert him to some kind of Kantian constructivism. I might pray for illumination by the Holy Spirit as I sought to deconstruct his world view or anti-world view as the case may be.