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When I was too old to be a child and too young to be a man I remember hearing this story. There once was a young girl named Suzie. She was your typical little girl; Suzie loved to play, laugh, and sing. Yet, there was one thing that made Suzie different from most little girls: she had a tremendous collection of dolls.

Suzie's father was a businessman who traveled all over the world, and wherever he went, he always brought Suzie home a doll. Suzie had dolls from every continent and dolls that could do all sorts of things. She had dolls that could dance. She had dolls that could sing. She had dolls with beautiful porcelain faces.

One day a friend of Suzie's father came over for dinner. He knew about Suzie's doll collection so he asked her to give him the grand tour. She showed him all of her dolls and what each of them could do. As the tour ended the man asked Suzie, "Which one is your favorite?"

Suzie thought for a moment and a wild gleam came into her eye. She dashed over to the toy chest and began taking toys out left and right until she reached the bottom and pulled out one last doll. As she showed it to the man, he was shocked; he was looking at the oldest, dirtiest doll he had ever seen. The doll only had one button eye left and a few strands of hair; the stuffing was falling out at the seams and its dress was badly tattered and torn. When he saw the disgusting doll the man asked Suzie, "How can this doll be your favorite?" Suzie looked puzzled, but simply replied to the man, "If I didn't love it, who would?"

As I reflect upon this story that I remember hearing for the first time during my teenage years, I cannot help but wonder if we could all become like Suzie. Would it really be possible for all of us to be so selfless in loving others as she is? What would happen if humanity were able to universalize such a consciousness? Could every person actualize his or her own self conscious so that each individual could make a conscious motion away from his or her natural egoistic tendencies and achieve a nearness to pure altruism, and what would be the results of such a revolution? As I have considered these questions in growing detail, I have concluded that by enabling an ethical model of the individual based roughly on the Kierkegaardian notion of the "Three Stages on Life's Way," humanity would have the potential to move beyond its tendency toward violence and hatred.

In his many works, Kierkegaard makes a phenomenological analysis of humanity that allows, potentially, for the individual to be classified into one of three states or modes of living. Each of these stages, the Aesthetic, the Ethical, and the Religious, describe what the actions of a specific individual would be at a particular moment when confronted with a decision.⁽¹⁾ We can characterize the individual's movement from one stage to another by the individual's ability to "change his life through significant choice": a conscious decision to enact the will to perform actions repeatedly that satisfies the criteria of the following rather than preceding stage.⁽²⁾

Using this concept of stages as a starting point, we can construct a more complete system, or phenomenological analysis of humanity, that espouses trends for guiding the actions an individual ought to take. However, to undertake such an endeavor we must begin by expressing more clearly what each of these stages describes in detail according to this revised ethical system and phenomenological analysis.

The Aesthetic Stage shall remain consistent with its original presentation in the works of Kierkegaard. It describes the individual who values the hedonistic lifestyle. He or she makes decisions based upon the pleasure that the particular individual derives from the decision; changes in lifestyle are driven by boredom.⁽³⁾ The person of the Aesthetic Stage is completely directed by sensory perception and emotion. However, the most defining characteristic of this stage is the absence of any form of a universal moral standard.⁽⁴⁾ The aesthete believes this mode of sensory driven living is the ultimate expression of the individual's freedom.

Kierkegaard describes his second stage as the Ethical. In this stage, the individual accepts universal moral laws and applies them to his or her life.⁽⁵⁾ By insisting upon responsibility, Kierkegaard makes a clear distinction between his conceptions of the first and second stages.

Although I will continue to refer to this stage as the Ethical Stage, I would like to extend some of the concepts that Kierkegaard hints at in this stage of his phenomenological analysis. Henceforth, we could most similarly equate the Ethical Stage to Kantian Duty Ethics. It is the Kantian conception of the categorical imperative that plays an influential role in the Ethical Stage. The categorical imperative is a moral rule that exists universally at all times and in all places. This form of a statement describes the universal ethical "duty" that the individual has to others and to him or herself. However, it is important to note that the statements that describe our duties and act as universal laws are categorical imperatives, not hypothetical imperatives.⁽⁶⁾ A hypothetical imperative is a standard conditional statement that has an antecedent that is followed by a consequent.⁽⁷⁾ Perhaps the most common form of this kind of statement is the if-then statement, which provides that given the condition a is true, then it is a logical necessity that consequence b is true. It is easy to see a clear distinction between these different forms of statements since the hypothetical imperative is conditional and the categorical imperative is universal. Since the rules of Kantian Duty Ethics hold true for all people at all times, it follows then that the rational moral agent (the individual) must will his or her own actions to be universalized.

The final stage that Kierkegaard left us with is the Religious. According to the original stages as prescribed by Kierkegaard, this final stage represents the teleological suspension of the ethical. Kierkegaard describes how this suspension operates through the analogy of the biblical story of Abraham in his work Fear and Trembling. He states about Abraham, "As the single individual he became higher than the universal. This is the paradox, which cannot be mediated."⁽⁸⁾ As such, the final stage is described as the Religious for Kierkegaard because it describes a person overcoming the ethical only by an act of faith that places him or her as the individual before God.⁽⁹⁾

Although the concept of the teleological suspension of the ethical is important to the new ethic, I shall reserve comment about it for later. Unlike Kierkegaard, rather than referring to the final stage as the Religious, we shall refer to it as the Stage of Dilection. Since the ethical system that I have constructed does not rely on the conception of a deity, I have renamed the final stage in order to remove that implication. This stage operates out of a system that is similar to that of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. For Aristotle, his system of Virtue Ethics put its end in happiness. We can achieve the happiness that he describes through the habitual activity of virtue.⁽¹⁰⁾

However, the Stage of Dilection is slightly different from the traditional Aristotelian Virtue Ethic. In this stage, the end goal is not happiness; rather it is the kind of love that can be described by the word dilection or the Greek conception of agape. The Stage of Dilection encourages the individual to will himself or herself to perform acts out of pure altruism. Again, in this stage, just as Aristotle drew a clear distinction between theoretical and productive science, it is by action, not contemplation alone, that we enter this stage. It is in the Stage of Dilection that the individual transcends the realm of rational thought and his or her actions reflect a heightened consciousness of altruistic motive or dilection.

It is important to remember when considering this new ethic that there are still some principles of Kierkegaard's original concept that hold true for it. For instance, Kierkegaard discusses in great length the need for a "willed repetition" towards the "telos."⁽¹¹⁾ Although the parameters of the "telos" or final goal have changed, the need for "willed repetition" remains.

Certainly, we need to clarify this concept of "willed repetition." It is only by an individual's habitual actions as prescribed by a specific stage that allows us to assess the development of his or her moral character. Although such a system seemingly devalues the individual action, the sanctity of it is preserved by action taken that either elevates or devalues the habitual character of the individual. We could consider such actions to be the beginnings of monumental shifts in character. An analogy might be a child's first step. Every parent wants to be there to see his or her child's first step as it is a sign of progress, and this event is very important in the development of the child. However, the fact of the matter still remains that the child will probably repeat the very same action billions of times in his or her lifetime.

There are some other outlying parameters of the three stages, the Aesthetic, the Ethical, and the Stage of Dilection, that we should discuss. We must note that these three phases exist universally for all of humanity. That is to say that every individual may be classified into one of these categories in regards to his or her ethical nature.

However, although we can apply the stages universally to humanity, the stages are not progressive. As such, the ethic is entirely situational. Each time that an individual is faced with a choice, we can classify his or her decision in any of the three stages. In this way, the ethic is different from a hierarchal system like that of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development.

It is also important for us to note at this time what distinct characteristic or series of characteristics the individual must realize and actualize when progressing from one stage to the next. Although progression is not required since the ethic is situational and not hierarchal, it is important to determine what are the defining characteristics between each stage. Essentially, we must know what it is that the individual must realize and put into action in order to make a decision that would be classified in a stage that is different from the one that he or she has either been traditionally operating out of or chose to operate out of upon his or her previous will to action.

The great segue between the Aesthetic and the Ethical Stages must be the realization of duty. Such a realization is a passing from the hedonism of the Aesthetic Stage to an understanding of the rational agents obligation to universal moral laws. However, it is important to note that the realization of this difference is not enough to propel the individual from the Aesthetic Stage to the Ethical, rather, "he must make the transition to the next level by an act of choice, by self-commitment."⁽¹²⁾ It is by this realization of duty and ethical self-commitment that we can separate the Aesthetic Stage from the Ethical.

The transitional element between the Ethical Stage and the Stage of Dilection is not as easy to describe as our previous segue. Here the transitional element is the response of the individual to a higher call. Between these two stages, we must recognize what Kierkegaard acknowledged as the greatest difference between the Ethical and Religious Stages of his ethic: a teleological suspension of the ethical. Such a suspension is not a negation of the ethical or morality. Rather, it enumerates the realization and action upon a calling that surpasses reason or the universal moral laws of the categorical imperative.

Certainly, the claim to a teleological suspension of the ethical seems far-fetched. However, we must keep an open mind about this subject until we can consider a few other aspects of the system. However, before continuing it would be helpful to consider the model of the ethical system in its entirety.

One will immediately notice that the stages of the ethical system are accompanied by two separate continuums that run parallel to it. The upper continuum describes any action in its relationship to the two diametrically opposed poles of egoism and altruism. It is interesting to note that if we considered the three stages as a spectrum that runs parallel to this continuum, then an action considered to be taken out of pure egoism would fall within the Aesthetic Stage. However, an action taken out of a particularly altruistic motive would find itself either within the Ethical Stage or the Stage of Dilection. The Egoism-Altruism Continuum and the Spectrum of the Three Stages can be seen to be in a direct relationship.

We must also take into consideration the accompanying addendum, found above the Egoism-Altruism Continuum. This force describes one final psychological point about humanity: although the individual can strive to perform an action out of a completely altruistic motive, such a feat will never occur. The Egoistic Mutations Shift at the top of the model describes the psychological tendency of man towards egoism. This line of mutation does not mean that no action can have altruistic intent or that every action stems solely from egoism. Rather, it means that although the individual may perform a specific action out of a particularly altruistic motive, there always exists (no matter how minute) an egoistic motive to accompany it.

Although some might pass off such psychological egoism as rubbish, we must wrestle with the topic. Let us consider a particular action a. By performing action a, Bob intends to help Mary. Bob's wanting to perform this act is a revelation of his innate egoism.

Certainly, philosophers have debated upon this argument for many years. James Rachels argues that this train of thought is invalid for two reasons. First, he states that it assumes that people will never voluntarily do things that they do not want to do. Rachels describes a second flaw of psychological egoism by arguing that a selfish act depends not only on the attitude of the subject, but the object that the subject desires.⁽¹³⁾

Although both of these arguments have strong merits, they ultimately do not seem convincing. Certainly, we can all imagine a situation where someone performs an action that under normal conditions they would not want to do voluntarily. However, we can, with a fair degree of certainty, make the statement: Any individual who performs the given action x against his or her desires y, holds fast to an alternate motive z that in some way supercedes the desires y and compels the individual to perform the given action x.

Although Rachel's considers this proposition, he disregards it as invalid by giving us the example of an individual who performs an action even though that person does not want to because he or she has promised to do it.⁽¹⁴⁾ However, Rachels does not consider the concept of the ulterior motive, as described by the desires y in the above italicized statement, that we can ultimately determine to be egoistic. His second argument also falls flat when we consider egocentricity to be the expression of egoism. Egocentricity can be defined as being concerned with oneself before society or others.⁽¹⁵⁾ In no definable way is egocentricity dependent upon the object of consideration; such a motive is based solely in the desire of the subject.

When we acknowledge the tendency of Egoistic Mutations in relation to the Egoism-Altruism Continuum, we find the logical conclusion is that although the individual can tend toward pure altruism, the natural Egoistic Mutations of humanity make achieving such an end impossible. We can liken this situation to that of Zeno's paradox. Although Achilles constantly gets closer to the tortoise, under the ramifications of the paradox, he will never overtake him. Here, the individual may infinitely move toward the teleological end of pure altruism, however, he or she can never reach such an end.⁽¹⁶⁾

Finally, there is one last parallel that we need to make mention of that exists between the Egoism-Altruism Continuum and the Spectrum of the Three Stages. Since any particular action can be judged not only by the stage that would describe it but also by the extent to which it strives to be a purely altruistic action, the three stages act not merely as a system of categorization, but also as a spectrum. Consider figure two for example. If the x, y, and z each represent three different specific actions arising from the same ethical dilemma, we see that each of these actions placement with in the Spectrum of the Three Stages lines up vertically with the corresponding letter's placement on the Egoism-Altruism Continuum. The placement of the action on both the Egoism-Altruism Continuum and the Spectrum of the Three Stages through direct relationship allows us to make distinctions between actions that would fall within the same stage.

The model also makes an interesting distinction in the Ethical Stage that is uniquely Kantian in nature. Kant makes it clear that within his Duty Ethics there are two ends of action which are duties: duty directed toward oneself in the attempt to perfect oneself and become virtuous and duty directed toward others in the attempt to further their happiness.⁽¹⁷⁾ This distinction allows us to divide the Ethical Stage into two levels describing these two forms of duty.

Although this distinction seems insignificant, it is a key factor in understanding the teleological suspension of the ethical that characterizes the distinction between the Ethical Stage and the Stage of Dilection. As we have already noted there is a correlation between the placement of actions on the Egoism-Altruism Continuum and the Spectrum of the Three Stages. When the habitual actions of an individual begin to fall within the portion of the Ethical Stage that perpetuates the duty to others, the individual is bound to realize the limitations of reason and universal moral law when trying to accomplish this end. It is at the point when the individual decides to take actions, for the benefits of others, which would under normal circumstances go against the principles of reason or the universal moral law that he or she has reached the Stage of Dilection and has teleologically suspended the ramifications of the ethical.

Let us consider Kant's "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives" (or the Case of the Inquiring Murderer) as an example of this suspension. The simple situation begins with a man fleeing from a murderer running up to you and telling you that he is going home to hide. However, the murderer then comes after him and asks you where the first man went. The moral question then is whether or not to tell the truth in this situation. In the end of this vignette Kant reassures us of the need for universal moral law by saying, "To be truthful (honest) in all deliberations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency." Kant makes this claim by explaining that although in this situation it seems that lying would be the expedient thing to do, we cannot know what results will actually come about from our action of lying. Since we cannot know that lying will save the man's life, or as he goes so far to say that by lying, we might actually condemn him to death, we should tell the truth.⁽¹⁸⁾

To follow the universal moral law in this situation would be to follow the categorical imperative that we should never lie. However, given the circumstances of the situation, it seems unethical to follow this universal law, despite the fact that it is what reason dictates should be our action. In such a situation, if the individual chooses not to answer the murderer or to lie to him, then the individual has made a teleological suspension of the ethical out of an act of love for the man fleeing from the murderer.

Another example could be of the proverbial child playing in the road as a car is barreling down upon him. Seeing that the car is cormng to quickly and that there is no guarantee that the individual can save the child without injunng him or herself, the rational thing for the individual to do would be to try and alert the child and save him if at all possible. Such an action would be both rational and hold to universal moral principles. However, the person who has made the leap to regularly taking actions out of the Stage of Dilection would not consider the danger of the situation for him or herself, and would only consider the safety of the child, blatantly ignoring any rational tendency toward self-preservation. A person operating out of the Stage of Dilection would be emboldened by love to try and rescue the child, even at his or her own expense.

Finally, there is one last continuum that is parallel to the Spectrum of the Three Stages and the Egoism-Altruism Continuum: the Duty Continuum. Kant refers to duty in his ethics as the necessity for actions taken with respect to the universal moral law.⁽¹⁹⁾ We can parallel how difficult or easy it is for the individual to fulfill his or her duty with the Spectrum of the Three Stages and the Egoism-Altruism Continuum as shown in figure two. This is to say that as an action is deemed more egoistic or a part of the Aesthetic Stage, then it is most difficult for the individual to fulfill his duty. If an action is deemed to be particularly altruistic and it falls in the Stage of Dilection, then its relation to universal moral law no longer defines the sense of duty for the individual, but by its relation to it being an action of love. As such, for the individual who acts out of the Stage of Dilection, to fulfill his or her "duty" in relation to love is fairly simple and actually enjoyable.

Now that we have considered this phenomenological analysis of the ethics of man, we must question what the implications of such a system are: if such an ethical system were to be known and acknowledged by humanity and its "telos," the Stage of Dilection, became the "telos" of every individual, what would the effects of such a shift be. Although such speculation is ambitious and far-fetched, it is a question worth considering in order to determine the logical consequences of the theory.

We know that any individual that has reached the Stage of Dilection has teleologically suspended rational elements and the universal moral law in order to pursue the higher or nobler goal of dilection. Dilection actually means love, but it is a diligent love to which the word is referring. It is a love that is assiduous. If the individuals of a particular society all acted out of such a motive from its conception, then the issues of hate, violence, and fanaticism would be avoided from the very beginning.

Obviously, the societies of the modern world have not been acting out of this motive. If the modern person were able to shift to this final stage of ethical behavior in our modern world, we could begin to see drastic changes within our own societies. I am not only talking about a revolution in the peace process to avoid wars and heightened tensions between nations. In fact, changes on such a national level would take a long time to achieve under this ethic simply because it deals strictly with the individual. As such, the peace process that will lead us to a friendlier global community is the responsibility of every individual.

Since the ethic is so individualistic and existential in nature, it would be difficult for me in particular to discuss what specific actions any particular person (beyond myself) would have to change in order to elevate him or herself to the heightened consciousness that can be characterized by the Stage of Dilection. However, I can discuss what changes I would need to make in my own life in order to achieve such an end.

Although up to this point I believe that I would have characterized myself as a fairly moral and ethical person, as I have written this paper and considered many of the events in my own life, I must admit that I to often find myself operating out of the Ethical and Aesthetic Stages. For instance, I worked as a counselor this past summer at a small Lutheran church camp in Texas called Lutherhill. On one particular instance, I took issue with the theological thoughts of another counselor at the camp, which he had posted publicly in a letter to the other counselors. As I read the letter, I was infuriated by it and wrote a retaliatory letter, which I also posted, despite the fact that I was advised not to do so. As I consider the situation in hindsight and in light of this ethical system, such an action was not even beyond the Aesthetic Stage; it was an action driven by my base, egoistic tendency to try to prove that my thoughts were correct and more conclusive than his were. I should have operated under the precepts of the Stage of Dilection: to try and talk with the other counselor rationally and in private to try and understand his views and express my views to him in a manner that would encourage not only my action to come from the Stage of Dilection, but in a way that would encourage him to operate out of the same teleologically suspended state.

There have been many instances where I have acted out of one of the lower two stages instead of out of the assiduous love of the Stage of Dilection. Times where I have lost my temper, refused to forgive someone, try to prove myself worthier of approval than someone else, or simply promoting my own interests over helping a friend with a worthy cause. All of these instances where I have acted out of the Aesthetic or Ethical Stages were lost chances to realize the assiduous love that exists beyond the confines of reason.

In the end, it is my responsibility and solely my responsibility to try to act out of dilection, assiduous love, for all other people at all times. Such a call is not easy for me or for any other individual I would imagine. However, it is only by promoting the love that comes from actions that meet the precepts of the Stage of Dilection that humanity could reach a true and lasting peace with each other as we relate on an individual level and as nations. Through assiduous love, we can turn the other cheek to acts of hate and violence and begin the process toward reconciliation.

1. Fredrick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 7, From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 344-347.

2. George J. Stack, "Kierkegaard," in A Companion to the Philosophers, ed. Robert L. Arrington (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 354

3. Stack, 354.

4. Copleston, 7:342.

5. Copleston, 7:343.

6. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill College, 1999), 123-125.

7. C. Stephen Layman, The Power of Logic, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill College, 2002), 20.

8. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University, 1983), 66.

9. Copleston, 7:344.

10. Fredrick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Greece and Rome (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 344-347.

11. Stack, 355.

12. Copleston, 7:342.

13. Rachels, 74-75.

14. Rachels, 74.

15. Merriam-Webster 's Collegiate Dictionary, 11^th ed., s.v. "egocentric."

16. Copleston, 1:57.

17. Ralf Meerbote, "Kant" in A Companion to the Philosophers, ed. Robert L. Arrington (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 349.

18. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 348.

19. Meertobe, 347.

Works Cited

Copleston, Fredrick. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, From the Post-Kantian Idealists, to Marx, Kierkegaarcl, and Nietzsche. New York: Doubleday 1994.

________, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 1, Greece and Rome. New York: Doubleday, 1994. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

Kierkegaard, Soren . Fear and Trembling and Repetition. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University, 1983.

Layman, C. Stephen. The Power of Logic, 3d ed. New York: McGraw Hill College, 2002. Meerbote, Ralf. "Kant." In A Companion to the Philosophers, ed. Robert L. Arrington, 338-351. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3d ed. New York: McGraw Hill College, 1999.

Stack, George J. "Kierkegaard." In A Companion to the Philosophers, ed. Robert L. Arrington, 352-355. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.