This Month's Colloqium

Colloquia Archive

I. Introduction.

Recent events in the news--the ACLU's threat of a lawsuit against Catawba County if the cross as a symbol is not removed from the county seal, the Supreme Court's June ruling that school sponsored prayer at sporting events are a violation of students' constitutional rights, and Vice-Presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman's public prayers and assertions regarding religion (i.e.,'There must be a place for faith in public affairs.")-- have inspired a renewed interest in the debate over the meaning d the First Amendment, also known as the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. What, if any, role should religion play in our public business? Does the Constitution require a strict separation between church and state? How can a religious person live a life of faithfulness in a secular world?--all are questions worthy of discussion.

In an interview on CNN's Talk Back Live (August 29, 3:00 p.m.), Abraham Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League asserted that "religion is counter Productive to the social fabric of our country," that there is "no universal value, no universal standard of morality," and that "to say morality is founded on religious faith excludes thousands. . . ." Later in the discussion, Foxman asks, "What is the nature of our society?" and then pronounces, "Religion doesn't belong in government," and this has been the case "for the last 200 years." Later, on the same telecast, Richard Lessner of American Renewal offered this rebuttal to Foxman's assertions, "American people are deeply religious people [and have been] from the outset of our country. He points out that there are numerous references to God "in our founding documents," and adds that "It is wholly alien to our history to push religion back into the ghetto of privacy."

In this paper, I will. argue against what appears to be the prevailing view among Americans today: that any reference to one's faith as a basis for policies and/or laws for the society crosses what was intended to be an impenetrable boundary between church and state, a boundary erected by our founding fathers through specific provisions as stated in Article VI and the First Amendment. (Mr. Foxman's view above) I will argue that the Framers of the Constitution never envisioned nor intended that citizens should leave their faiths behind upon entering the public arena and that we as individual citizens should refuse to do so! (Mr. Lessner's position)

II. Religion in the State.

The historical context in which the Framers wrote the Constitution included what Robert Bellah (in 'The Revolution and the Civil Religion," in Religion and the American Revolution, Fortress Press, 1976) terms a general civil religion. This "natural religion" consisted of belief in God, belief in the afterlife, and belief in divine punishments. It was thought to be "written in the hearts of all mankind, yea, even in pagans" and was generally agreed to be an indispensable prerequisite for government. (Bellah, 57) It was what Richard John Neuhaus refers to as the lowest common denominator of a diversity of religious beliefs, and was the motivating force for public values and virtues, which were then fabricated into polity. (The Naked Public Square, 141) Adams, Tocqueville, Lincoln, and a host of others understood religiously based values to be the points of reference for public moral discourse. (NPS, 145) The institution of religion was, and was expected to be, an active participant in the public arena, and religious belief was regarded as the agent of reinforcement and support (the "backstop") to the public ethic.(NPS, 22) There is ample evidence throughout our national history of this state endorsement of religion. The words "In God We Trust" appear on our currency, officials take oaths of office with their hands on the Bible, even the Supreme Court begins its sessions with the injunction, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court!"

One can cite, as well, a vast body of political writings in which references are made to God and His relationship to our nation and its people. For example,

"May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none to make him afraid. May the father of all mercies scatter light and not darkness in our paths, and make us all in our several vocations useful here, and in his own due time and way everlastingly happy. (President George Washington's 1790 letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island)

"It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us--that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion--that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain--that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom--and that govermnent of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. " (Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address)

"We have waited f'or more than 340 years for our constitutional and God-given rights. . . . Of course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil disobedience. It was evidenced sublimely in the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego to obey the laws of Nebuchadnezzar, on the ground that a higher moral law was at stake.... I am grateful to God that, through the influence of the Negro church, the way of nonviolence became an integral part of our struggle.... We will win our freedom because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in our echoing demands.... One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up for what is best in the American dream and for the most sacred values in our Judseo-Christian heritage, thereby bringing our nation back to those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the founding fathers in their formulation of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. (From Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Letter from Birmingham Jail)

"When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary. . . to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them....We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 6 Happiness.--" (From The Declaration of Independence, drafted by Thomas Jefferson)

That religion played an important part in our nation's formation and history is beyond dispute. Why, then, should we unquestioningly accept strict separationist interpretations of the First Amendment and Article VI of the Constitution?

III. The Establishment Clause Interpreted as The Separation of Church and State: A Misunderstanding of the First Amendment.

The First Amendment of the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It is, I think, noteworthy that this amendment has come to be known as the "Establishment Clause" rather than as the "Free Exercise Clause," especially since the emphasis is undeniably on the freedoms of speech and assembly--and of worship.

George Anastaplo, in The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary (John Hopkins University Press, 1995), explains that "The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment oblige Congress to stand clear of religious establishments, which means that Congress can neither provide for religious establishments of its own nor interfere with any State religious establishments then existing or later to be developed." He argues further that the Establishment Clause has been distorted by the Courts. Says Anastaplo, "That clause is now interpreted virtually to mean that governments cannot cooperate at all with religious institutions, for example, by providing some public funding of church-sponsored schools. (Add footnote here: The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Mitchell v. Helms offers hope of a more accommodating interpretation.) This has long seemed to me a misreading of the First Amendment: the forbidden 'establishment' does not refer to official cooperation with religion but rather to official preference for one or a few religious sects at the expense of all the others in the community." (56) He points to examples of collaboration between Church and State in 18th-century America, among them the concluding article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which declares that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience;" but then adds "and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other. (283)

Misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause may be due to confusion caused by the lack of knowledge of the historical context in which Article VI of the Constitution was written. Article VI states that ". . . no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." According to Anastaplo in The Constitution of I 787: A Commentary, this portion of Article VI is often erroneously interpreted to mean that the Framers were expressing their disapproval of religious tests and thereby instructing us to keep our religion out of our politics! Not so, says Anastaplo. The Framers were in fact deferring to religious sensibilities (i.e., the Quakers) by allowing an affirmation instead of an oath. At the same time, explains Anastaplo, the Framers relied upon religious sensibilities as evidenced by their recourse to oaths taken by government officials (i.e., "I, . . . do solemnly and sincerely aclmowledge. . . So help me GOD."). Their prohibition of a religious test is not indicative of an abhorrence of such tests, but shows instead an awareness of a possible problem, even danger, inherent in such a test if ordered by the General Government for the Country at large because of the diversity of religious beliefs from State to State.

Among the eleven State constitutions Anastaplo cites in his discussion of the Constitutional context of Article VI is the 1776 North Carolina Constitution. Its two articles dealing with religious matters are as follows:

"That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.

'That no person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State." (210)

Even more expansive are the religious requirements of the 1778 South Carolina Constitution. In addition to its provision that "the Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed . . . the established religion of [the] State" it mandates that every religious group "of fifteen or more male persons" is "to be incorporated and esteemed as a church of the established religion" and accordingly must subscribe to the following five principles:

It is obvious from an acquaintance with these documents, that the prevailing view held by my (and your?) ancestors with respect to the role of religion in public life was vastly different from contemporary interpretations.

Anastaplo suggests that two other State constitusions--Virginia, cited earlier; and New York--are closer to the spirit of today's separationist understanding. The 1777 New York Constitution, seeking to nullify any parts of the common law inherited from the British common law that might be "construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their ministers," states:

And whereas we are required, by the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind, this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the free exercise of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind:

"Provided, that the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State. (212-213)

"Religion, in all of the colonies, was made use of politically even while a considerable degree of religious liberty was guaranteed." ¹

Anastaplo asks, "Is it likely, therefore, considering the various religious tests that had been so recently provided for in State constitutions, that the Framers of the Constitution of 1787 considered religious tests simply bad or improper? The samples I have collected here, except perhaps those from the New York and Virginia Constitutions, suggest otherwise." (213) The "no religious Test" requirement did have the effect subsequently, once the original purpose of its inclusion had been forgotten, of fostering the view now common among Americans in general that such tests should never be employed by government. Later nineteenth-century State constitutions, as a result, were modelled after the Constitution of 1787 and lost most of their religious passion. "No doubt there are sound arguments in support of this liberalizing development," writes Anastaplo, "but surely not the argument that this is what the Framers intended, however salutary the restraint they exhibited." (213)

If the Framers' original intent cannot be used to justify a separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause, then why have Supreme Court rulings spanning five decades (beginning in 1947, with Everson v. Board of Education) determined "a wall of separation" between religion and govemment?

IV. The Naked Public Square.

According to Richard John Neuhaus in The Naked Public Square, the erosion in the relationship of religion to American public policy can be seen in the gradual elimination of God language from official public discourse. Up through and into the mid-twentieth century, the United States had been described as a Christian/religious nation. Even Thomas Jefferson, though not a conventional religious person (He thought one of the central purposes of the Declaration of Independence was to free people from the "monkish ignorance and superstition" of Christian orthodoxy.), recognized the role played by religion in our American democracy. In a reflection on the immorality of slavery he argues:

And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever; that considering numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation is among the possible events; that it may become probable by supernatural interference! The Almighty has no attribute which can side with us in such a context. (NPS, 100)

Jefferson understood religion to be the foundation of our democratic society.²

As late: as 1931, the Supreme Court in US v. Macintosh, a case dealing with whether or not a conscientious objector could become a citizen stated: "We are a Christian people, according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God." (NPS, 80) Subsequently, in 1952, Justice William O. Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson, a dispute over students getting off from public schools in released time for religious instruction, wrote: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. " (NPS, 80) This decision is sometimes dismissed by determined secularists as an aberration in American judicial history, but Douglas's accompanying explanation proves otherwise.

We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events [such as "released time" in schools] to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. (NPS, 100-101)

Abingdon, a case dealing with Pennsylvania's practice of Bible reading in government schools, came before the court in 1963. Justice Clark, in writing for the majority, attempted to show agreement with previous court decisions. He stated that "the history of man is inseparable from the history of religion" and further observed the belief in God of many of the founding fathers as well as other instances in which the state recognizes religion. He concludes: "It can be truly said therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are 'earnestly praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe . . . guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing]."'

Abingdon, according to scholars, represents a significant shift from Zorach. Among indications cited are: no affirmation that our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, no admission that people have religious needs that must be respected by the state, and no declaration of the need for the public encouragement of religion. "All that is recognized [in Abingdon] is that our people do in fact participate in religious observances. . . . The Court does not say whether it is good or bad that our national life reflects a religious people" (Glen Thurow cited by Neuhaus, NPS, 101) Abingdon further introduces, in its ruling, a distinction between religious freedom and religious observance: Clark states, "This is not to say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Thurow explains this distinction thus: "Religion and the policy of freedom of religion are no longer seen as having a common root in recognition of presumed spiritual needs and institutional dependency on a Supreme Being. There is not one tradition, but two. (NPS, 102)

In the remaining years of the 1960s, the court's interpretation of the meaning of religion in the lives of Americans changed radically. Religion, as the court defined it, became extremely individualized and privatized. Instead of referring to communal traditions of ultimate beliefs and practices, religion became synonymous with conscience. In Welsh v. US, 1970, another case related to conscientious objection, military draft exemption was allowed according to the "registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong [provided] those beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions." Religion has become, then, a matter of sincerity rather than content, a matter of individual conviction rather than communal values. "In short, it is no longer a public reality and therefore cannot interfere with public business." (NPS, 80)

That religion, as interpreted by the courts of our democratic government, has evolved into a personal private matter without the possibility of being translated into the public sphere is curious, especially in light of various later court rulings (i.e., Lubbock Independent School District v. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 1983. See pp 147-148, NPS), the intention of the First Amendment to the Constitution was to grant a privileged status to religion. (NPS, 148) "The primary reason for the 'no establishment' clause [which is in the service of the 'free exercise' clause] is not to prevent the church from taking over the state but to prevent the state from taking over the church. The church is the particular society within society that bears institutional witness to the transcendent purpose to which the society is held accountable." (NPS, 116) The distinction between religious observance and religious freedom in Abington (as described previously) is also curious--and for the same reason: "Religious freedom was not Primarily freedom from religion-- although the freedom to espouse no religion or even to oppose all religion was carefully protected--but freedom to exercise religion in whatever way a person deems fit. " (NPS, 101) What was written for religion's protection has now been misinterpreted into a handicap: ". . . separation has provided the legal rationale for the sanitizing of the public square." (NPS, 26) Truth claims and normative ethics with specific reference to God have been excluded. The "common denominator" has been extracted in the name of religious freedom.³

V. Taking Back the Public Square: the Correct Interpretation of the First Amendment.

(This section is still being formulated; I will discuss ideas put forward by Raymond W. Mitchell in an article entitled "A Small Departure from the Truth: When Private Religious Speech Runs Afoul of the Establishment Clause" published in Vol. 23, No. 4, of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. Copies will be available at the colloquium or by mail, upon request.)

From Raymond W. Mitchell in Loyala University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, Summer 1992):

"A concern for religious liberty and the rights of the individual demands that all of the rights guaranteed in the First Amendment be given full and equal consideration. The First Amendment confers on religious speech the same protection that it confers on other forms of speech. The Establishment Clause should promote religious liberty and thwart efforts by the government to interfere with religion, not facilitate those efforts. (891-892)

 The problem, as articulated by Raymond Mitchell: "Together, the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause have fostered and promoted free thinking aud self-determination and have become the bedrock of American liberty. However, the governnent's interest in adhering to the dictates of the Establishment Clause may conflict with an individual's right to free speech. The question then arises as to whether the Establishment Clause takes precedence over an individual's right to speak freely. . . . This Comment examines whether private religious speech in a public forum is analogous to governmental religious speech and whether under the First Amendment a court properly may impose on private religious expression the same restrictions that it imposes on governmental religious expression. " (867-868)

VI. The Place for the Faithful: the Public Square.

(Time and space preclude what would otherwise be a lengthy discourse here, and, since my husband is admonishing me to hurry, I merely suggest to you some of my ideas relating to the importance of witnessing to one's faith in the public square. We will discuss these ideas and/or others on Thursday afternoon. MHY)

• On the Consent of` the Governed.

While the Constitution guarantees that we have the right to speak-freely in the public square, the Declaration of Independence compels us to participate actively in government. It states (following Locke): "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,-- That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government,..."

The laws of our nation are ". . .of the people, by the people, for the people. . . ." We construct human law; our civil laws come from what we agree to. . . .Our principles (especially our religious principles) should inform/dictate what we agree to!

How can one who is a believer [in God]--one who consents to be governed [by the laws of the state]--stay at home on election day?! If one fails to concern herself with elections, etc., then one gives tacitisilent ascent to the principles and endorsements of whatever person/group achieves power. It's one thing to be ignorant of what is night and to do unwittingly the wrong, but ifs quite another to abdicate one's duty and consent to whatever/whoever is offered!

From Martin Luther King, Jr.: '"We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of` the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co-workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation." (17) ("Ietter from the Birmingham Jail" in GB volume On Justice )

• On Being a Faithful Christian. (I am a Christian.)

We are called to be disciples of Christ, no matter the context! (The difference between an apostle and a disciple might be a helpful separation of roles here.)

There are many aspects of my religious faith for which it is, I think, sufficient for me to bear witness ('This is what I believe. . .") without any need to express afterwards, "I think you should believe this also. . . " (i.e., that Jesus the Christ is the Son of God). Bearing witness is what is required (I must tell others/I must preach the gospel) and letting "he who has ears to hear, let him hear. " Sometimes more is required of us than verbal testimony: a cup of cold water in my name. . . feed the hungry. Jesus did not instruct us to preach as we give the water--but to give it in His name (I do this because I follow Jesus; I do this because I am a Christian.).

But there are certain actions, certain betrayals of our faith that we do not do because "I am a Christian," and this is where many of the moral/ethical issues of our time need addressing--because of who, indeed Whose we are.

We are called to be God's children. Christian is not a name tag we take off as we leave the church or as we enter the courthouse--or the voting booth. To be a Christian is to be--a state of being--who we are! Always diligent to be sensitive and loving when/as we are called upon to speak the truth, always aware that our words may be distorted and even misused by others who do not share in the fruit of the Spirit. A tension exists: we must be always vigilant and always compassionate, but not afraid to speak boldly a word from the Lord (Love does not insist on its own way; love is not jealous or boastful; love rejoices in the right.).

• On What is Reauired of Us. Micah 6:8: "What is required of thee is to dojustice, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with God."

Discerning the truth--what is justice?/what is right? What is the truth? Both in the world of experience--empirical truth--and the truth (the rightness or wrongness) of an issue or principle in the context of one's faith--objective truth/the truth of God. We need to hear with our own ears, unfortunately, what the politicians are saying or to read or view entire speeches or interviews if we are to know with certainly what is being argued, what is being promised, etc. Network presentations are biased even in what they choose to report vs. what they choose to leave out. (i.e., The silent protest of the Texas delegation at the Republican National Convention to the speech of a gay congressman and little to no coverage of the protest against the Boy Scouts at the Democratic National Convention; making much of the diversity at the Republican convention as "staged" and very little made of the strict quota system enforced upon the Democratic delegations!) We can no longer be certain that the media will convey the factual truth to us.

As to knowing what positions we should take on issues which fall under the categories of God's law as well as the human laws we make for living in community with each other--we need to study the writings, the canon of our respective faiths. We live at a time when many of our churches' leaders have abandoned the moral teachings of our respective traditions. (We are being given in some cases, I think, falsehoods instead of truths--perhaps intentionally, perhaps due to ignorance, perhaps due to political self-interest. For example, an essay published in Taproot , ajournal of the Lutheran Southern Seminary in Columbia, S. C., gives an erroneous interpretation of Plate's Symposium 'in an argument favoring the marriage and ordination of homosexuals.) It is up to us to study faithfully the scriptures and the documents of the church fathers, the ideas which have withstood years of critique as to their universal wisdom, and the writings (and lectures) of learned persons of our own time--knowing who-the wise ones are in our contemporary context can be a test of one's perseverance and judgment, I might add--in order to develop our God-given capacities of discernment, so that we may know to the best of our abilities--through right reason, as the ancients called it--what the Truth is concerning. . . abortion, homosexual rights, the waging of war, physician-assisted suicide, to name only a few of the issues confronting us.

From Martin Luther King, Jr., on what is a just law?: "How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. . . . Segregation. to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an 'i-it' relationship for an 'I-thou' relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things." ("Letter from the Birmingham Jail" in GB volume On Justice )

• And one final. personal, Christian witness--perhaps not scholarly, certainly not politically correct--but from both my reason and my heart:

How can we have so hardened our hearts that we can dismiss the issue of partial-birth abortion as a woman's right to choose--no matter what--without any feeling whatsoever for the unborn little one? Why can't we see the face of Christ in the face of the tiny child who is about to have her brains sucked out? How can satisfaction with the economy trump concern for "the least of these, my brethren"? Oh, America, what are we becoming?

1 Anastaplo cites seven other State constitutions (New Jersey, Georgia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire--two others were omitted as they were merely adaptations of ancient Colonial Charters).

2 While it is thecase that Jefferson provides the source in his Letter to the Danbury Baptists for a separationist interpretation of the First Amendment, his metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state, it is also the case that examples of his actions (i.e., He sponsored a bill in Virginia to punish persons who did not observe the sabbath, and, when President, permitted federal help for religious missions to the Indians. See Mitchell, note on page 871) support an accommodationist view, as discussed in a later section of this paper.

3 According to Neuhaus, it is the rise of pluralism, "a legalized secular distortion of Judaeo-Christian concern for the marginal," which has precipitated the expurgation. 'The 'free exercise of religion' becomes the legally protected right of the dissident to freedom from religion's exercise. " (NPS, 147) Specifically mentioned as contributing factors in the determined emphasis on the individual and his rights, are the policical ramifications of civil rights legislation. Neuhaus writes: "With respect to racial justice, law intervened in order to protect blacks from the majority moral sentiment or lack thereof. The legal precedents set in order to remedy racial injustice, however, are now exploited by every borderline person or group in order to establish their claim of immunity from prevailing moral sentiment. (NPS, 150) The Vietnam War also contributed to the nakedness of the public square. The debate over the war became highly moralistic in a way that further confused the meaning of public morality. Both supporters and opponents of government policy insisted that the war was "a moral issue." Even politicians claimed that Vietnam was a moral issue rather than a political one, without distinguishing the one from the other. (It's interesting to note that Neuhaus defines a "moral issue" as a political issue with the volume turned up.) "It was as though, by declaring something to be a moral issue, political judgment was superseded or suspended." As a result, the Vietnam debate ". . . tended to increase the separation between the political and the moral. That is, by setting moral judgment against political judgment, the possibility of political morality was reduced." (NPS, 186)]